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Abstract
In recent years, a spate of cities -- including Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland -- have shifted governance
structures to give more control to mayors in the hope that such changes would ultimately lead to
improved school quality and student achievement, as well as to diminished scandal and turmoil in the
school systems. A closer look at these instances, however, shows that these governance changes have to
be understood within the broader context of a particular city, and the particular frustration and challenges
that led to the willingness to alter the top levels of educational control. The ways in which mayors have
become more engaged with schooling have varied -- from low involvement (for example, trying to
influence traditional school board elections) to high involvement (gaining formal control over the schools
or appointment of school board members). Just as each city is different, so are the impacts (such as can
be determined) of governance changes. Most importantly, it is difficult to link these governance shifts to
improved instructional practices or outcomes.
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Introduction
In recent years, a spate of cities —
including Boston, Chicago, and Cleveland
— have shifted governance structures to
give more control to mayors in the hope
that such changes would ultimately lead
to improved school quality and student
achievement, as well as to diminished
scandal and turmoil in the school
systems. A closer look at these instances,
however, shows that these governance
changes have to be understood within the
broader context of a particular city, and
the particular frustration and challenges
that led to the willingness to alter the top
levels of educational control. The ways in
which mayors have become more
engaged with schooling have varied —
from low involvement (for example,
trying to influence traditional school
board elections) to high involvement
(gaining formal control over the schools
or appointment of school board
members). Just as each city is different, so
are the impacts (such as can be
determined) of governance changes. Most
importantly, it is difficult to link these
governance shifts to improved
instructional practices or outcomes.

Background
Changes in American big-city school
governance frequently focus on reform of
a prior reform (Tyack & Cuban, 1995). Los
Angeles, for example, decentralized
central office control somewhat by
creating regional superintendents in the
1970s, abolishing them in the 1980s, and
then reinstating them in 2000. Reformers
at the turn-of-the-Twentieth-Century
wanted to overcome the excessive
decentralization of ward-based 50-to-100member school boards, and the
corruption of mayoral and city council
influence in teacher hiring. Tammany
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Hall was the symbol of city government
in 1900. Consequently, reformers wanted
school boards independent of city
government, and touted the sevenmember school board as the best vehicle
for hiring a superintendent who would
hire the teachers. One of the prime
functions of the executive centralization
of a small board and certified
administrators was to create a uniform
citywide curriculum. Mayors were seen
as part of a discredited, inefficient,
corrupt regime that did not fit with the
industrial model of governance that
envisioned the school superintendent as a
chief executive officer (Tyack, 1974).
It was not until the 1960s that this
1900-1920 governance pattern was
challenged as undemocratic and
insufficiently representative of minority
groups. A partial reversion to the earlier
pattern was instituted. Five- or sevenmember school boards were elected from
geographic sub-districts of the city and
exercised tighter oversight of the
superintendent. Unions became
omnipresent and major players in board
elections, and voluminous collective
bargaining agreements grew annually.
Administrative decentralization in the
1970s consisted of area superintendents
for each of the five or seven districts in a
city. New interest groups created a
political pluralism representing such
interests as handicapped, bilingual,
disadvantaged, and gifted pupils. Boards
responded to these multiple governance
pressures, superintendent turnover
accelerated, and the era of the
superintendent as administrative chief
ended (Wirt & Kirst, 2001). Meanwhile,
the conditions of children deteriorated
into massive poverty, and big-city school
bureaucracies grew even more ineffective
and inefficient (Kirst & Bulkley, 2000).
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From 1960 to 1995, some large cities
like Chicago and Philadelphia preserved
a role for the mayor in appointing school
board members, but Baltimore was an
exception where the mayor continued to
exert policy control over the schools. As
the performance of city schools stagnated,
various governance prescriptions,
including sub-area decentralization and
weakly implemented school-based
management, failed to improve
performance. City school board members
increasingly saw their role as
redistributing school jobs and contracts to
benefit residents in the geographic slice of
the city that they represented
(Danzberger, Kirst, & Usdan, 1992).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
mayors like John Lindsey of New York
City and Jerome Cavanaugh of Detroit
stressed that city economies could not be
substantially improved without good
schools and middle-class students. But
these mayors hesitated to seek
operational control of the schools because
they feared that the school improvement
would not be enough to justify their reelection. During the 1980s, new African
American mayors such as Harold
Washington in Chicago and Coleman
Young in Detroit focused in part on
redistributing school jobs and services to
minority communities (Beinart, 1997).
The 1990s produced a 180-degree
reversal in the negative 1900-1920
Tammany Hall mayoral image. Some
mayors projected an image of efficient
public managers less interested in
redistributing jobs to minorities and more
interested in improved services. Mayors
argued that City Hall needed to provide
more integrated and coherent public
services, including services for children.
Better schools were essential to attracting
the middle class and business to the
central city. Anti-union Republican state
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legislatures in Illinois, Michigan, and
Ohio were ready to cut the influence of
teacher unions and the splintered school
boards that faced repeated financial
crises. Education reformers stressed that
the churn of new policies of each new
superintendent created lots of wheelspinning, but little educational attainment
(Hess, 1999).
It is too soon to assess whether mayor
control in such cities as Chicago,
Cleveland, Harrisburg, and Boston will
provide more coherent governance and
improved pupil performance. But there
are some positive signs. According to
polls, citizens in Boston and Chicago are
more pleased with mayoral control than
the school boards that they replaced.
Politicians from all over the United States
have visited Chicago to see the new
governance model where former city
employees have taken over key
bureaucratic operations such as personnel
and facilities. But in Baltimore, after years
of dismal pupil attainment and public
dissatisfaction, the mayor (who never lost
formal power over the schools) had to
surrender control to the state.
In 1999, the author served on
Oakland, California Mayor Jerry Brown’s
commission on education. The
commission favored mayoral
appointment of all school board
members, but not because the
commission thought that mayoral control
was a panacea. As this report
demonstrates, new governance decisions
depend largely on judgments about
conditions in a specific city context at a
particular point in time. The Oakland
commission decided that mayoral
takeover would stimulate more change
than electing two school board members
from geographic sub-districts every two
years. Moreover, in the fragmented policy
context where a recent state audit
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indicated the Oakland schools were in a
desperate plight, the commission judged
that the mayor had a better chance of
bringing about new coherent policies.
Criticism that mayoral appointment of
school boards provides less democracy
has justification, but the mayor is also
elected, and better known by the voters
than school board members. The
commission did not have research to
support mayoral control, so the
appointment issue was subjected to a
successful citywide referendum, and in
four years Oakland voters can decide
whether they want to restore board
elections.
We are in an era of experimentation
with various forms of mayoral influence
and control in public education.
Operation of the Chicago schools was
taken over by former employees of the
city including Paul Vallas, a versatile
public administrator, as superintendent.
Boston schools superintendent Tom
Payzant, a former superintendent in three
other cities, is a member of the mayor’s
cabinet. Boston citizens sometimes take
their concerns about the schools to the
city council because the school board is
advisory and does not react to citizen
complaints. Under Michigan law, the
Detroit superintendent has statutory
powers independent of the Detroit school
board. Local school board appointees
select the Detroit superintendent, but a
representative of state government also
sits on the school board. Oakland has a
mixed 10-member board — 7 members
elected by sub-districts and 3 appointed
by the mayor. Perhaps the most
successful city-school turnaround,
Sacramento, California, has no formal
mayoral appointment power, but was
galvanized by the election of a mayoralendorsed slate of candidates.
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Each new form of governance
depends on a specific city context, and the
willingness to make significant changes in
governance emerges from an intense and
long-gestating desire for a major shakeup in school policy and performance.
Looming in the background in several of
these cities is the fear of targeted or
massive voucher schemes if mayoral
action fails to improve the schools.
Vouchers and mayoral control co-exist in
Cleveland, Ohio, for example, where the
ultimately dominant governance pattern
is in doubt.
The arguments for mayoral control
have strong appeal for some. Proponents
justify giving the mayor control of, or an
increased role in, the schools because it
provides a single point of electoral
accountability, greater integration of
children’s services with schools, and
better pupil attainment. Such
improvements will spur city economic
development, stimulate more middleclass people to live in the city, and forge a
closer alliance between city government
and businesses. Mayors stress that they
are in a better position to integrate
citywide services (such as land use,
transportation, after-school programs,
and children’s social services) with the
schools. Political losers in this governance
shift are district central-office
professionals and, most important, the
school board.
Opponents to mayoral control assert
that a school board appointed by the
mayor will result in less democracy
because voters have fewer electoral
choices and cannot vote for a board
member from their section of the city. An
Institute for Educational Leadership
study found that electing school boards
by sub-districts changed the role and
behavior of school board members
(Danzberger et al., 1992). Boards became
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more attentive to the particular needs of
certain geographical sections of their
cities. The citywide education policy
perspective lessened, and board concern
with geographic redistribution of jobs,
contacts, and constituent services grew.
Minority representation on school boards,
however, increased when citywide
selection was changed to geographic
districts. Hispanic groups in the West, for
example, have strongly supported subdistrict board elections in order to
increase representation of minority
groups on school boards. Whether the
alleged policy benefits of mayoral control
are worth the loss of better geographic
representation cannot be decided by
general theories, but should be submitted
to the local electorate.
The 1900-1920 movement to centralize
school governance was justified in part by
a perception that a citywide curriculum
was needed to offset multi-lingual
approaches (Tyack, 1974). This perceived
need for centralization reoccurred in 1990
when city reading scores fell extremely
low. Proponents hoped that increasing
centralization through mayoral
appointment would lead to a more
intense and coordinated focus on reading
in big cities. Again, we see the reform of
an earlier reform. It was the alleged
excessive centralization of curriculum in
city schools that during the 1960s led in
part to the call for urban decentralization
to better meet the needs of diverse pupils
(Hannaway & Carnoy, 1993).
Governance changes, in short, are a
way to maximize certain conflicting
values and policies over others. As values
and needs change, governance revisions
such as mayoral control and
decentralization will recycle. Moreover,
entirely new governance forms (for
example, vouchers and contracting with
private firms to run public schools) might
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be emphasized in the future. Will any of
these governance alterations change
classroom instruction, attract quality
teachers, and improve pupil
performance? And if they do, what is the
connection between governance structure
and improved classroom instruction?
This report provides an overview of
recent mayoral-governance changes as a
prelude to answering these questions in a
few years.

Every City is Different
Mayors of many cities are using
different approaches to increase their
influence over the public schools. Some
mayors, such as those in Akron, Ohio and
West Sacramento, California, have only
gone so far as to threaten takeover unless
certain school policies change. Other
mayors, as in Chicago and Boston, have
taken over their school systems and
gotten involved in major decisions
affecting the school systems. In cities like
San Francisco, the mayor has not sought
direct control, but has strengthened the
liaison function between the schools and
the mayor’s office. San Francisco’s mayor
hired Ramon Cortines, the former
superintendent of New York City and San
Francisco, to perform this function.
The striking thing about the growth of
mayoral influence over schools is the
distinctiveness of each city. There are no
established patterns; form, function, and
operation of mayoral influence are all
over the map. These differences reflect
diverse city contexts, local political
cultures, interest group structures,
state/local relations, legal basis of city
government, historical school governance
structures, and other specific city
characteristics. The personalities and
ambitions of individual mayors are also
important. Mayor Tom Menino of Boston,
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for example, featured his school role in
his successful re-election campaign.
The array of mayoral interventions is
presented below, ranging from low to
high influence and providing specific
examples. Following presentation of the
array, some interesting city impacts are
examined in greater depth.

Low Mayoral Influence
Mayors have threatened to take over
schools, but pulled back when school
policy changed in Akron, Ohio and West
Sacramento, California. Mayors in Los
Angeles and Sacramento, California
endorsed slates of school board
candidates and provided substantial
campaign money and workers for their
board choices, but they did not seek to
overthrow the school boards’ powers or
to appoint board members.

Low-Moderate Mayoral Influence
Mayors appoint some school board
members, but not a majority of the board.
Voters in Oakland, California approved a
city charter amendment enlarging the
school board from 7 to 10 members, and
allowing Mayor Jerry Brown to appoint 3
members. The mayor’s appointees
formed a minority voting bloc that
opposed the superintendent more often
than the elected members. The Oakland
mayor wanted to appoint the entire
school board, but could not obtain city
council approval for more than 3 of the 10
members. Of the three candidates
endorsed by the mayor, only two were
successful.
Until recently, the mayor of
Baltimore, Maryland appointed all school
board members because Baltimore never
had an elected school board. However, in
1997, Baltimore received $230 million in
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state aid and, in return, the mayor lost his
prerogative to appoint all members of the
board of education. In its place, the
mayor and governor jointly appointed a
new nine-member board of
commissioners, based on a nominating
slate provided by the State Board of
Education. The following affiliations and
expertise were required of the new board
of commissioners: at least four
commissioners had to have a high level of
expertise in a large business, non-profit,
or governmental entity; at least three had
to have a high level of knowledge and
expertise in education; at least one
commissioner had to be a parent of a
student enrolled in the district; and at
least one commissioner had to have
knowledge or experience in educating
children with disabilities. The new board
of commissioners (unlike the old board
which had been appointed by and
controlled by one individual) is vested
with full authority and responsibility for
running the school system. In addition, a
14-member parent and community
advisory board was formed to solicit
parental input and involvement (Cibulka,
2001). The Baltimore mayor has selected
people with established credentials to
serve on the new board of commissioners,
including an education professor, a
facilities management expert, and two
other academics.
After Anthony Williams was elected
mayor of Washington, DC in 1998, he
sought more control over school policy by
proposing that he would appoint all 11
school board members. As in Oakland,
the city council resisted this, arguing in
favor of more electoral representation.
The parties compromised by creating a
hybrid nine-member board — four
selected by the mayor, four elected from
new geographic districts, and the
president elected in a citywide
referendum. District voters can revisit the
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governance structure through a
referendum to be held after four years
(Cibulka, 2001).
The mayor of New York City
currently appoints two members and the
city’s five borough presidents each
appoint one member to the citywide
school board. Newly elected Mayor
Michael Bloomberg has said he will lobby
state legislators to abolish the board and
have the schools operated by a
commissioner of education who would
report directly to the mayor.

Moderate Mayoral Influence
The Detroit mayor appoints six
members and the governor appoints one
member to the city’s school board. In
some decisions, however, the governor’s
choice has veto power over the mayor’s
six appointees. For example, the
governor’s representative vetoed first
choice of Mayor Dennis Archer’s
appointees for superintendent. But the
Detroit board does little other than choose
the superintendent, approve the
superintendent’s appointees, and
approve the annual school improvement
plans. The mayor’s deputy press secretary
has said, “The mayor has no direct
involvement in the schools…he has
enough on his plate trying to run the 10th
largest city” (Community Renewal
Society, 2001, p. 12). In addition, a
Michigan law has terminated the Detroit
principals’ union in order to provide the
superintendent with more flexibility.
The Cleveland mayor, under state
legislation, appoints the school board and
the district’s chief executive officer (CEO).
After 30 months, however, the mayor can
fire the CEO, but only with concurrence
of the board he appointed. Mayor
Michael White has chosen not to get
visibly involved in school policy or
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operations. Mayor White’s relationship
with CEO Barbara Byrd-Bennett is similar
to the relationship between a nonexecutive chairman and a CEO in private
business (Community Renewal Society,
2001, p. 6). Mayor White has been most
active in improving facilities, but he
meets infrequently with the school board.
He is kept informed, but has chosen to let
CEO Byrd-Bennett be the public leader.
Both mayoral candidates in the 2001
election supported the existing system,
but in 2002 Cleveland voters will have to
decide whether or not to reauthorize
mayoral control.
Philadelphia moved to the highinfluence category after the voters
approved a 2000 charter initiative
enabling the mayor to appoint all school
board members at one time.
Philadelphia’s previous mayor, Ed
Rendell, could appoint board members in
staggered terms, and he chose to defer to
his choice for superintendent on matters
of education policy and operational
decisions. Current Philadelphia Mayor
John Street has appointed a person in his
office to follow school policy closely and
to work with the board-appointed CEO.
Mayor Street has been able to increase the
number of charter schools in Philadelphia
(serving 6.5% of total enrollment in 2001)
despite resistance from the teachers’
union. A huge district deficit in 2001
forced Mayor Street to negotiate with the
state to provide more aid to Philadelphia
schools in exchange for greater state
policy control. The governor hired the
for-profit Edison Schools to rethink
governance and school improvement. The
Philadelphia Inquirer described the state
proposal this way:
Governor Schweiker’s Philadelphia plan
would transfer control of the school system
from local officials to his appointees, who
would then put its management in the hands
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of a private corporation — almost certainly
the for-profit Edison. Another seismic
proposal: turning over the 60 lowestachieving schools to partnerships of
community groups or universities and private
school-management firms.
The governor and other proponents of the plan
have cast it as a prototype for urban education
st
reform in the 21 century, one that opens new
opportunities for community leadership of the
schools. An angry Mayor Street, on the other
hand, has called it “fantasyland” and
“unacceptable.”
If no agreement is reached, a board — with
four of five members named by the governor
— would control the district for the next five
years and impose his original plan (“Lessons
from School Takeovers,” 2001).
In response to Mayor Street’s
objections, the governor agreed to drop
Edison’s central management of the
system, but insisted on district
governance by a five-member School
Reform Commission, with three members
appointed by the governor and two
appointed by the mayor. A super
majority of four is needed for many key
decisions, including selection of the
district CEO, adoption of the
Commission’s by-laws, selection of an
independent evaluator, borrowing of
money, and appointment of a general
counsel. In effect, the mayor’s two
appointees have veto power over these
matters.

High Mayoral Influence
The 1995 Chicago governance
changes granting an enhanced role to the
mayor were layered over reforms
instituted in 1988. The earlier reforms,
which were supported by state
Democrats and civic activists, shifted
power from the district to Local School
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Councils that appointed principals and
allocated significant discretionary money
at each school. The mayor’s ability to
appoint the city’s school board was
decreased under the 1988 legislation. The
impetus for decentralization was not a
desire to increase the influence of
educators. Shipps (2000) says, “Educators
were blamed for the problems and their
discretion curtailed.” Rather, the
legislation was designed to enhance the
influence of parents and community
members.
While the 1988 reforms pushed
control toward the schools, the 1995
legislation shifted power up the ladder to
the mayor. Chicago Mayor Richard Daley
favored this shift, but did not pursue it
publicly as the previous mayor had. Led
by Republican state legislators, the 1995
governance change emphasized
centralizing political accountability with
the mayor, adding the new structure on
top of the 1988 reform, rather than
replacing it.
The 1995 changes gave the Chicago
mayor more authority than any mayor
since before the Progressive Era,
effectively turning the public education
system into a department of city
government (Shipps, 2000). The 1995
legislation eliminated the school board
nominating committee, which had
effectively minimized the mayor’s ability
to select school board members, and
replaced the traditional board with a
corporate-style board. Under the new
structure, only one of five board members
was to focus on education (the chief
education officer), and there was a CEO,
rather than a superintendent. The
legislation limited the rights of unions to
strike, and redefined a large number of
issues as non-bargainable. The 1995
legislation enabled Chicago to contract
for many building repairs, services, and
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purchases instead of employing
numerous union personnel as under the
old system.

repair, and more politicians and parents
backing an urban school system that was once
considered a total loss.

Mayoral appointment of the school
board in Boston began in 1991. In 1996,
Mayor Menino made his choice for
superintendent, former San Diego
Superintendent Tom Payzant, a member
of his cabinet. The school board had been
reduced to an advisory role, and the
Mayor urged voters to hold him
accountable for school performance. A
1996 referendum to retain the mayoralappointed board was supported by 70%
of Boston’s voters, with only African
American communities opposed. Board
meetings were generally brief and poorly
attended, while the real decisions were
made by the superintendent and mayor.
Mayor Menino acknowledged that the
appointed board had not been accessible
to public concerns, but said he and the
superintendent would attend more to this
function (Yee, 2000).

In the past year, the 52,000-student district’s
test scores in elementary-age reading and
math have shown dramatic increases that
would be the envy of any school system. A
focused, determined school board, with a
majority of members who were backed and
supported by Mayor Serna, has ended the
bickering and deadlock that plagued the
district’s governance for years. The public has
shown renewed confidence and interest in the
schools by passing, in October, the district’s
first bond measure for school repairs in more
than 20 years.

Impact of Mayoral Control
It is not possible to link many changes
in school policy and practice to changes
in governance. Some major trends can be
attributed in part to mayoral intervention,
although there is no apparent relationship
between level (low, moderate, or high) of
mayoral influence and the impact on
schools. For example, Mayor Joe Serna of
Sacramento (low influence) recruited,
financed, and supported a slate of school
board candidates, but left them alone to
do their jobs. Education Week reported the
following results:
Many in California’s capital city of 369,000
credit Mr. Serna, who died of cancer
November 7, 2001, for pushing changes that
now have more children reading at earlier
ages, more school buildings scheduled for
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And despite some criticism of how the changes
are being carried out, Sacramento is being
looked at nationwide as a model of urban
school success (“Sacramento Mayor’s
Legacy,” 2000).
In addition, the Sacramento school board
elevated the deputy superintendent to the
top job, and he focused on changing
instruction through the Open Court
standardized reading program.
Los Angeles Mayor Richard Riordan
(low influence) used a school board
electoral strategy that raised $2 million
for a successful election. The mayor’s
reform board recruited former Colorado
Governor Roy Romer to be
superintendent. Romer re-centralized
some instructional policy and, like
Sacramento, installed Open Court as the
standard reading program. The Los
Angeles results on the state test (Stanford9) have not been as impressive as
Sacramento’s to date, but Superintendent
Romer has won the support of the Los
Angeles Times. Mayor Riordan also used
the influence of his office to speed
approval of new school construction in
this rapidly growing district.
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Among the moderately influential
mayors, Cleveland’s Mayor White
actively promoted the successful $1.4
billion 2001 referendum to replace aging
roofs, faulty wiring, rotted windows, and
other chronic school building problems.
Cleveland political observers contend that
the voter support needed to upgrade the
schools (average age of 51 years) was
generated in part by increased public
confidence in the new CEO, Barbara
Byrd-Bennett. In 1999, Byrd-Bennett
announced instructional reforms and
accountability changes that centralized
the system and de-emphasized past
policies to provide parents with greater
school site influence (Ryan, 2001). The
impact of her reforms is unclear, but
Byrd-Bennett is so popular that mayoral
candidates hoping to replace Mayor
White in 2001 sought her endorsement.
Mayors perhaps have the least impact
where the mayor’s powers are least clear,
as in Oakland and Detroit. In Oakland
(low-moderate influence), Mayor Jerry
Brown has focused more on charter
schools; his three mayoral appointees
have not coalesced with the seven elected
board members and their appointed
superintendent. The new superintendent
in Detroit has a lot of formal power, but
has not sought a close relationship with
city government, perhaps because the
mayor’s term expired in January 2002.
The Washington, DC school system has
made progress in restoring public
confidence under the leadership of
experienced superintendent Paul Vance,
who once headed the large nearby
suburban system in Montgomery County,
Maryland (Cibulka, 2001).
The state-ordered demise of the
Detroit school board was viewed by city
voters as usurpation without any local
legitimacy (Gewertz, 2000). Despite
media support for the new regime (low-
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moderate influence), public opinion polls
have indicated that voters, under the
referendum allowed by the state law,
want to return to an elected board in
2003. The last president of the Detroit
school board was indicted on corruption
charges. The new superintendent has
managed to build more schools and make
badly needed repairs, but the elected
board could not agree on how much to
spend of the $1.3 billion bond approved
in 1993. Both mayoral candidates
supported the new superintendent who
has two more years to make a bigger
impact (D. Plank, interview, November
2001).
The cases of Boston and Chicago (high
influence) have received the most
academic scrutiny. In both cities, the
primary movers behind the governance
changes granting more power to the
mayors were the business community,
the mayor (especially in Boston), and
state legislators. Local groups, such as
community activists and minority group
representatives, were not directly
involved; educator organizations
including the teacher unions were either
peripheral to the debate or opposed to the
change.
The proponents of the governance
changes in Boston and Chicago had
certain similar goals, but also some
important differences. There was a strong
emphasis in Chicago on improving the
efficiency of the public schools,
particularly the fiscal efficiency of the
district. Shipps (2000) notes that the 1995
governance changes were a continuation
of longstanding efforts to improve
efficiency and restructure accountability.
This emphasis reflected the interests of
the Chicago business community.
Improved efficiency was a factor in
Boston, but not as central as the issues of
standards and curriculum (Yee, 2000).
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The role and purpose of the district
leader was another difference between
the reforms in these two cities. Reflecting
the focus on efficiency, the Chicago Public
Schools would be led by a business-style
CEO, rather than a traditional
superintendent. In contrast, the Boston
mayor wanted a strong educator-leader at
the head of the school system. Boston’s
Mayor Menino wanted to be held
accountable for the state of the Boston
Public Schools, and he wanted to be
directly involved in the district’s
operations. He wanted to place a strong
superintendent who would be a part of
the mayor’s cabinet, and who would not
have to contend with the many demands
of an elected School Committee. The
intentions of those who initiated the
governance changes in Chicago and
Boston were reflected in their
implementation, especially in the interests
and styles of the new leaders chosen with
strong mayoral input.
The governance changes that shifted
power toward the Chicago and Boston
mayors set the stage for substantial
alterations within these two school
systems. The mayors and their chosen
leaders took advantage of the new
structural changes to implement
substantive reforms. Paul Vallas, former
Chicago budget director, assumed the
new position of CEO of the Chicago
Public Schools. The selection of Vallas
reflected the business community’s
interest in a leader from outside
traditional public education. Vallas
believed that clear accountability, in
combination with running the district
more like a business, would lead to an
improved organization. In this top-down
change model, management creates the
vision and defines clear sanctions for
individuals and schools that fail to
progress toward that vision (Shipps,
2000).
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The selection of Tom Payzant as
superintendent of the Boston schools was
a far more traditional choice for district
leader. His selection reflected Mayor
Menino’s interest in a professional
educator who would avoid, to some
extent, the political issues that consumed
much of the time of previous
superintendents. Payzant’s approach was
within the framework of traditional
education reform; his primary focus
reflected a professional education model
involving higher standards and capacitybuilding (Yee, 2000).
The new governance structures in
Chicago and Boston, in combination with
the mayors and district leaders who
sought to improve the school systems,
resulted in changes that reflected the
different intentions of those who sought
the new structures. In both cities, there
were shifts in the practical operations of
the district and in the overall message
about teaching and learning sent by the
mayors and the education leaders.
Some very visible and practical
changes occurred in the first years
following the 1995 reform in Chicago. For
the first time in years, the school district
budget appeared to be in reasonable
shape. This change may have been due in
part to Mayor Daley’s willingness to
support the schools through property tax
increases and funds diverted from other
parts of the city budget. In addition, there
was relative labor peace in the Chicago
Public Schools. There has not been a
strike since the governance changes took
place.
Some major changes occurred
following the arrival of former city
budget director Vallas at the district’s
central office. Roughly 100 former City
Hall employees came to work in the
central office, displacing more traditional
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education staff. In addition to the CEO,
the leadership of the Chicago school
district was now largely from the
business sector, rather than from
education. School-site councils still exist
at all the Chicago public schools, but their
influence has been reduced; new central
office leaders have increased their role in
the operation of the schools. The
combination of no budget crises, no
strikes, and generally positive public
opinion of the reforms instituted by
Vallas has improved the legitimacy of the
school system over the last several years
(Shipps, 2000.)
The direct impact of the changes in
the governance structure of the Boston
Public Schools has not been as marked as
in Chicago. The most notable change was
the elimination of the bitter battles within
the school committee and between the
committee and the mayor — a logical
outcome of having an appointed rather
than elected school committee. The
committee included allies first of thenMayor Raymond Flynn, and later of
Mayor Menino. Many committee
members had close ties to the business
community. As in Chicago, labor
relations, particularly with the teachers’
union, improved in the years following
the governance change. Also similar to
Chicago, some of the most blatant budget
problems disappeared in Boston. The
Boston mayor has always influenced how
much money is spent by the public school
system, but the new governance changes
allowed the mayor also to influence how
the funds were spent. Unlike in Chicago,
however, there were no dramatic changes
in the structure or staffing of the district’s
central office, and no transfer of city
employees to key positions in the
district’s central office (Yee, 2000). But
Mayor Menino has provided a clear focus
for public accountability by saying to the
electorate that he wants to be judged for
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election by school improvement (Yee,
2000).
The style and substance of the
education reforms taking place within
these governance changes are quite
different in the two cities. The overall
focus in Chicago has been on
accountability, defined largely by test
scores and taking action where schools
and students do not meet predefined
goals. According to Shipps, the emphasis
has been on strong and immediate
sanctions for principals of schools that
did not meet performance goals set by
CEO Vallas. This was especially true for
schools whose students fell into the
bottom 25% of test scores in the district;
these schools faced high-stakes
consequences such as probation and
reconstitution. For students, there were
new and high-stakes repercussions for
low-test scores as well. The most public
example was Vallas’s call to end social
promotion. Students who did not meet
required performance levels at certain
grades faced mandatory summer school
and generally would not be promoted if
their test scores did not rise adequately
by the end of the summer session.
These accountability measures mostly
focused on minimal standards and
improving the educational outcomes of
low-performing students in Chicago’s
schools, but there were also changes
affecting students at the upper end of the
performance spectrum. For example,
Vallas supported the creation and
expansion of alternatives, including
magnet schools, charter schools, and
accelerated programs such as
International Baccalaureate options. In
addition to efforts removing
“troublesome or slow-learning students”
from regular public schools to other
settings such as transition centers and
alternative high schools, there was a push
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for more “upper-end” options linked to
the goal of attracting middle-class
families back to the Chicago Public
Schools.
Overall, Vallas based his efforts on
two assumptions. First was the
assumption that much of the capacity
needed to improve performance was
already available within the public school
system, but incentives and sanctions were
necessary to elicit this pre-existing
capacity. Thus, there has been less
emphasis on building additional capacity
in Chicago than in other districts, such as
Boston. The second assumption was that
test scores, while not a perfect measure,
were the most logical means of assessing
progress in providing quality education.
However, when test scores maintained a
plateau in 2001, Mayor Daley decided
Vallas had done all he could do to
improve test scores, and forced him and
the board president out. Accountable to
the electorate for major changes in policy
and personnel, the mayor thought the
district needed to supplement its gettough accountability policy. The new
Chicago superintendent is searching for
better instructional strategies with greater
impact.
In November 2001, the Illinois State Board of
Education included three-fourths of the state’s
elementary schools on its academic Early
Warning List, based on state assessment
scores. Sixty-seven of Chicago’s 76 high
schools failed the Eleventh Grade Prairie State
Achievement Exam. Still, while statewide
scores remained flat, Chicago’s overall state
test scores rose slightly and Mayor Daley’s
new magnet schools had some of the highest
scores in the state. Five of the state’s top 10
elementary schools were in Chicago, but so
were 21 of the state’s bottom 25 schools.
Chicago’s chief accountability officer defended
the magnet schools, “If we did not have these
[magnet] programs, we would probably lose
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these kids to private and parochial schools”
(Banchero, Olszewski, & Dougherty, 2001).
The style of the education reforms
undertaken in Boston arose from a similar
governance change, but the experience
was quite different from Chicago. Former
Mayor Flynn and Superintendent Lois
Harrison-Jones were the first leaders to
experience the mayorally appointed
school committee, but the major changes
largely resulted from the actions of
Mayor Menino and Superintendent
Payzant. In contrast with Chicago’s CEO
Vallas who was an education outsider,
Payzant was very much the professional
superintendent who wanted to work
primarily within existing structures.
Vallas relied heavily on the existing
capacity within the school system;
Payzant focused on increasing capacity.
According to Yee (2000), “Payzant
emphasized his long-term commitment to
steady, resolute progress through staff
training, new materials, and high
standards.”
Improvement strategies employed by
Payzant included raising standards,
leadership development, whole-school
change, and developing a reorganization
plan focused on student performance. His
focus on teaching and learning relied to
some extent on professional norms, rather
than sanctions, as a means of improving
performance. Unlike Chicago under
Vallas, there has been little change in the
tenure of administrators or teachers in
Boston, and no talk of school-site
reconstitution. Payzant introduced school
report cards that included Stanford-9 test
results. Payzant replaced the district’s
standardized test with the Stanford-9
because he believed it better reflected the
district’s new standards that emphasized
higher-order skills.

Mayoral Influence, New Regimes, and Public School Governance

The new governance frameworks in
Boston and Chicago set similar stages for
educational reform, but the leaders in
these two cities used the expanded role of
the mayor to make quite different
changes. Both cities had strong mayors
and sufficiently large problems in their
schools that the state legislatures (and,
the individual voters in Boston) were
motivated to enact major structural
changes. The actual regime change
occurred, however, when the mayors,
school leaders, and others used the
governance changes to significantly alter
the administrative and educational
practices of the district leadership, and
through these alterations, change the
practices of educators in the schools.
The different directions taken by
Boston and by Chicago leaders were not
just whims of the individual mayors and
school district chiefs. To some extent the
different directions reflected the historical
political culture and the desires of
powerful constituencies within these
cities and states. The regime changes
particularly reflected the different
emphases of the business communities in
Boston and Chicago. Selection of a
business-style leader like Vallas to lead
the Chicago school system was not
surprising given the role of the business
community and Republican legislative
leaders in initiating the 1995 reform. The
focus on management issues in Chicago is
consistent with the interests of its
business community. The Boston business
community, however, tended to focus
more on issues of school quality, so an
experienced superintendent was a more
acceptable choice.
The regime changes in both cities are
still relatively new. But there is little
indication that there will be a return, at
least not in the near future, to the
previous governance structures. It is more
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likely there will be ongoing tinkering
within the present regimes than major
structural changes.
Wong and Shen (2001) have
compared the effects of mayoral takeover
in Boston and Chicago with state
takeover in Lawrence, Massachusetts and
Compton, California. They concluded
that mayoral takeover had a positive
impact on pupil achievement:
First, mayoral takeover is linked to increases
in student achievement at the elementary
grades. Second, gains in achievement are
especially large for the lowest-performing
schools, suggesting that mayoral takeovers
involve a special focus on these failing schools.
Third, mayoral takeover seems less effective
for the upper grades, where the cumulative
effects of many years of poor schooling are not
easily reversible. Fourth, when state takeovers
produce administrative and political turmoil,
student achievement suffers. After a period of
adjustment, however, state takeovers may also
be able to produce positive achievement gains.
Wong and Shen (2001) write that
mayoral control had other attributes:
Our analysis of city and state takeovers
suggests the following conclusions. First,
there are significant differences between
mayoral takeover and state takeovers, and
mayoral takeovers appear to be more
productive in terms of academic improvement.
Mayoral takeovers may make a significant
impact on the lowest-performing schools.
Second, takeovers may also produce more
efficient financial and administrative
management, and in the case of mayoral
takeover, lead to a broadening of management
expertise. Third, both city and state takeovers
bring with them a heavy emphasis on
academic accountability, and mayoral
takeovers are more likely to utilize additional
tests beyond state-mandated exams.
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Table 1. Outcomes in Mayor-controlled School Districts
Outcome
Aligned curriculum,
tests, professional
development, and
rewards/penalties

Boston
Moderate

Chicago
Low

Philadelphia
Low

Political support of
district reforms

High

High

Low

Improved coordination
of city and school
services

Slight

Slight

None

Teachers

Moderate

Moderate

High

Principals

High

High

High

Elementary

Slight

Moderate

Moderate

Secondary

No

No

No

No

No

No

Increased turnover
among:

Improved test scores:

Reduced gap between
white and minority
scores

Source: L. Cuban and M. Usdan. (2002). Powerful Reforms with Shallow Roots: Getting Good Schools in Six Cities.
New York: Teachers College Press.

The Six-City Study
Research scholars have conducted
1
case studies of six cities that used
mayoral control or school boards that
appointed unconventional
superintendents who had no prior
experience in education administration
(Cuban & Usdan, 2002). In general,
under mayoral control they found
improvement over the previous regime
of school boards, but little evidence of
reaching higher goals such as
1

These cities were Chicago, Boston, San Diego,
Seattle, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.
14

widespread instructional improvement
in classrooms. The researchers did find
“partial evidence of increased city and
school coordination,” but not at the level
that mayoral-control advocates hoped
would take place. An overview of the
findings for the three mayoral-control
cities is presented in Table 1.
The six-city study found that Boston
was making progress in aligning the
various elements of its systemic strategy
to support principals and teachers in
helping students to improve academic
performance, but Chicago and
Philadelphia were not. Support from
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business, media, and elites were
strongly favorable of mayoral actions in
Boston and Chicago. But, as Cuban and
Usdan (2002) note:
Although the Chicago and Philadelphia
cases offer instances of CEOs decisively
acting in determining budgets, waiving
rules, and slicing through bureaucratic
layers, the accumulated evidence for the two
cities counter civic and business leaders’
deep wish to connect governance changes
and better management to improved student
outcomes.
Cuban and Usdan applaud Boston
for its leadership stability in extending
Superintendent Payzant’s contract from
1996 to 2005. They contend that a school
without broader linkages to city,
community, and private out-of-school
services has little chance of success.

Conclusion
There is no political majority urging
return to school board-dominated
regimes in any of the cities that moved
toward greater mayoral influence over
the schools. Boston voters have
reauthorized mayoral control in Boston,
and the Illinois legislature extended the
Chicago mayor’s regime for another
three years. Sacramento does not regret
former Mayor Serna’s campaign for a
new board. Detroit has seen the
president of its prior school board
indicted for corruption. Still, the impact
of enhanced mayoral influence on
instruction remains tenuous and unclear
(Rich, 1996). Mayors are able to help
balance the budget, improve buildings,
and increase school supplies, but
intervention in the classroom is more
difficult. The most notable trend in these
cities, however, is the diversity of the
governance arrangements and how local
context and civic culture determine
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whatever outcomes ensue (Stone, 1998).
While some mayors got involved in the
details of school management, others
provided their appointed
superintendents wide discretion in
running the schools. Increased
centralized control of education policy
was a consistent trend among these
districts; there was no district where
mayoral influence was primarily
oriented to decentralizing policymaking
to the schools.
Mayor Menino of Boston and Mayor
Daley of Chicago sought to become the
central symbol of school accountability,
while Detroit Mayor Archer and
Cleveland Mayor White preferred to
stay behind the scenes and have the
superintendent the focus of
accountability. Several mayoral regimes
need to be reauthorized by the voters in
the next five years. These elections will
determine in large part whether 19952001 was just another quick cycle of
mayoral influence, or a more lasting
governance change (Boyd and Cibulka,
2002). Even if these new regimes are
extended, there are limits to mayoral
influence and control:
In other words, mayoral control of urban
schools is merely one reform strategy.
Changing governance arrangements clearly
can make a difference in the way urban
public school systems function, but such a
strategy requires the right combination of
ingredients — committed and skilled
leadership by the mayor, willingness to use
scarce resources, a stable coalition of
supporters, appropriate education policies,
and a cadre of competent, committed
professionals to implement the reforms
(Cibulka, 2001, p. 35).
State domination of governance,
where mayors play a secondary role to
the state as in Philadelphia and
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Baltimore, is one possibility for more
urban districts. Mayors may have to
demonstrate increases in pupil
attainment and financial stability in
order to ward off state intervention. The
mayors of Baltimore and Philadelphia
traded increased state aid for increased
state control, so city economic growth
may be a crucial factor. Slow-growing
city economies will reduce local tax
revenues and lead to calls for financial
bail-outs by the states. States, however,
seem less inclined to provide more
money without a greater governance
role, including state appointment of
board members.
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